In Institutional thought, property rights are effective in the most inefficient allocation even after the creation of competitive prices. So, not only it can be treated as a given variable but outcomes of any collective action are completely associated with distribution of these rights among the different actors. Therefore, from the perspective of institutionlists, appropriate policy making in property rights is the basis of any institutional reforming in a collective action. However, this approach to property rights in oil industry, from the beginning of its formation, property rights is the pivot of its challenges, can lead to novel policy implications and recommendations, that because of the ignorance of institutional thought capacities has not be considered until now. As the results of this research are be showing, due to some of ongoing rules of the game, in one hand, ownership pattern of oil industry cannot be independent from the role of international oil and gas corporations. On the other hand, it cannot be ignored the role of state in any policy making for property rights in the oil industry of Iran. Nevertheless, like a lot of successful experience in the developed countries and by use of joint venture companies comprised of the partnerships of state oil companies and international oil & gas companies, we can reduce significantly the transaction costs in Iran's oil industry